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Abstract 
Robust design has a large potential to contribute to product and process improvements 
providing increased customer value. However, it has shown to be difficult to obtain 
these benefits in practice. This study aims to evaluate and learn from an initial 
approach in introducing robust design within the Volvo Group. It is based on three 
pilot cases within the product development organization of a business unit. Data were 
collected through formal interviews and informal dialogues with pilot participants, 
supplemented by existing documentation of the pilot cases. The main finding was that 
a robust design initiative, characterized by ‘tool-pushing’ and with a predefined 
solution introduced by an external consultant, faced many obstacles and could not 
create a sustainable result. Instead, it was found that there is a need of involving the 
engineers and creating a learning culture in which robust design principles can 
become a natural part of work practices. This study identified six obstacles for the 
success of the initiative, which were perceived as learning points for a broader 
application of robust design at the company. This underscores that robust design 
initiatives can also be hampered by similar types of obstacles that have been identified 
in research of other change processes. 
  
Keywords: change management, resistance to change, localizing, middle 
management, product development, robust design method, P-diagram, Pugh matrix 
1 Introduction 
Robust design refers to decreasing the unwanted variation of product performances 
through considering the sources of variation already from early phases of product 
development. Any method or strategy with this purpose could be considered under the 
robust design concept, e.g. the Robust Design (RD) method (Taguchi, 1986). There 
are many examples of the benefits that result from the application of robust design, 
but also many examples of companies having difficulty in making robust design a 
standard practice within product development (Hasenkamp, 2009).  
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The Volvo Group4 has been successful in designing and marketing its products over 
many years. However, the corporation recognized that in order to sustain its success it 
needed to integrate robust design as a standard practice within product development. 
But the question is how to do this. The Volvo Group has been testing a number of 
approaches to introduce robust design, and this article presents an evaluation of one 
such approach, referred to as the RD initiative. The approach began in 2004 when an 
experienced external consultant was hired, to drive an ambitious initiative within one 
business unit in the Volvo Group. The aim was to introduce and apply the Taguchi 
RD method in three ‘pilot projects’. However, it was observed that the application of 
the RD initiative in this unit was not appreciated by the product development 
engineers at the first trial. As a result, the company decided that before continuing 
with additional efforts, it would be good to reflect upon and learn from this relatively 
unsuccessful trial.  
 
This paper presents the results of reflecting upon the experience of the first trial and 
provides some learning points. The learning includes identification of obstacles to the 
diffusion of the RD method, and a discussion of possible measures for successful 
application of robust design (Section 4-5). The insights from this first trial have been 
used in the design of later initiatives within the Volvo Group. 
 
2 Methodology 
This paper is based on a study of an RD initiative within a business unit (~4,000 
employees) of the Volvo Group. The initiative includes three pilot cases within the 
product development organization.  
 
A case study approach was used to investigate the application of the RD method 
within the company (e.g. Merriam, 1988; Yin, 2003). This investigation started after 
the termination of the RD initiative. Data were collected through 9 semi-structured 
interviews with employees who had been involved in the planning and/or participated 
in the implementation of the RD initiative (2 top managers, 3 quality managers, 1 
project manager and 3 development engineers). The interviews were supplemented by 
informal dialogues with the participants in the RD initiative. In addition, secondary 
data were used, such as documents and archival records (e.g. protocols), an evaluation 
questionnaire, presentation material and consultants’ reports from the initiative. The 
analysis was initially conducted directly on the basis of the empirical data, guided by 
the research question: What were the obstacles affecting the introduction of the 
Robust Design Method in product development processes? Then the empirical 
findings were compared to relevant literature, i.e. the analysis was conducted 
according to an ‘abductive’ approach (Dubois & Gadde, 2002). 
 
The first and the third authors are part of the Volvo Group and involved in the 
initiatives to implement robust design. This has provided them with excellent access 
to internal company data, but naturally also increases the risk of ‘going native’. 
Hence, the second author, from an external university position, has had a role of 
examining and discussing the findings from an outsider perspective. However, in the 
case of this first initiative, the lead author was not directly involved in the pilot 
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projects, and thus the evaluation has been conducted from various positions on the 
insider-outsider scale (de Guerre, 2002; Coghlan & Brannick, 2005). 
 
3 Previous Research 
This section comments upon the limited use of robust design in practice (3.1), 
presents research focused on measures to increase acceptance of robust design in 
industry (3.2) and concludes with theory on resistance to change (3.3). 
 
3.1 Limited use of robust design in industry  
The approach developed by Dr. Genichi Taguchi, the Robust Design method (RD 
method), can be seen as pioneering in practical industry application (Phadke, 1989). 
Taguchi’s starting point was that any decrease in product/system quality leads to 
customer dissatisfaction5 and therefore, the focus should be on ‘building in’ quality by 
designing for ‘right on target’ specifications (best values). The aim was to design 
products and processes which are insensitive to noise factors (sources of unwanted 
variation) under actual, real-life conditions with the help of simplified statistical 
techniques (Taguchi 1986). The RD method was launched in Japan in the 1970s, but 
its use among Japanese companies was limited. The method first gained wider 
recognition in the United States in the 1980s and was then re-imported to Japan 
during the 1990s; however, with the exception of a few companies, e.g. Fuji Xerox, 
the RD method failed to be extensively applied (Hino, 2006). 
 
A major part of the research literature on robust design is within a tool-based research 
tradition and has been focused on developing statistical techniques for identifying 
robust design solutions (Hasenkamp et al. 2009). However, robust design, as a general 
concept, has gradually become popular also in product development literature (e.g. 
Araujo et al., 1996; Ulrich & Eppinger, 2004). Despite the popularity of the robust 
design concept in the research literature, the application of the robust design 
methodologies in industry does not seem to be very widespread (Thornton et al., 
2000; Antony, 2002; Gremyr et al., 2003; Arvidsson et al., 2003; Saitoh et al., 2003).  
 
3.2 Approaches to increase acceptance of robust design  
The gap between a growing research interest and limited practical application has 
inspired researchers to search for ways of increasing the acceptance of the concept of 
robust design in industry. An awareness of variation and robustness has been seen as 
an important driver for implementing the robust design methodology (RDM).6 
Hasenkamp et al. (2007) provided review questions for each design phase in order to 
increase the awareness of variation and thinking in terms of robustness. They also 
presented guidelines for implementing the RDM in a generic product development 
process by providing recommendations for which RD tools are suitable for different 
phases of the PD process.  
 
                                               
5 This is expressed in Taguchi’s ‘quality loss function’ that states that any deviation from the target 
value leads to a quadratic loss in quality (or customer satisfaction). 
6 RDM is referred to as any systematic effort (statistical or non-statistical) to achieve insensitivity to 
noise factors (the sources of variation) (Arvidsson & Gremyr, 2008). 
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Yet a further step to increase acceptance has been to utilize the ‘practices’ concept in 
order to create a link between ‘general principles’ behind the RDM and the use of 
‘tools’. Arvidsson and Gremyr (2008) identified the underlying principles as: 
awareness of variation, insensitivity to noise factors, and continuous applicability (i.e. 
that robust design is applicable in all phases of a product development process). Based 
on a literature review, Hasenkamp et al. (2009) aimed at identifying the missing link 
between the principles and the tools in their model, i.e. the ‘practices’. For the 
‘awareness of variation’ they identified three practices: focusing on customers 
(meaning identifying key product characteristics that can be translated into 
measurable quality characteristics), identifying and understanding noise factors, and 
checking assumptions. ‘Insensitivity to noise factors’ was also linked to three 
practices: exploiting nonlinearities and interactions, designing for insensitivity to 
noise factors, and using conventional design rules. Concerning the last principle, 
‘continuous applicability’, no specific practice was identified. Instead, Hasenkamp et 
al. (2009, p.653) pointed out that “this principle rather concerns organisational issues, 
such as how RDM is implemented and organised in a company.” However, they 
provide references to the importance of making robust design part of the standard 
design procedures and in the mind-sets of all product developers (Mörup, 1993); and 
of not forcing engineers to make use of tools – instead, the issues should be explained 
to the engineers followed by providing them with appropriate RDM tools, in order to 
keep the resistance within a limit (Saitoh et al., 2003).   
   
In an empirical study, Gremyr and Hasenkamp (2011) continued to study the 
difficulties that a company faces when trying to introduce RDM. They identified a 
gap between principles and tool use and suggested that this gap could be bridged by 
practices. However, in their discussion they primarily elaborate upon the role of an 
RDM mentor as a solution to bridge the gap, i.e. an organizational solution, which is 
outside their framework of practices. Discussing ‘Views on robust design 
methodology’ they also comment that their interviewees had referred to both personal 
and general reasons as barriers for employees to proceed in the RDM implementation. 
Common personal factors include backgrounds, experiences, interest in RDM, 
inclinations, working preferences and access to software products. General factors 
mentioned include lack of resources (time and money), that RDM was applied too 
late, and trusting one’s own experience more than the RDM tools. Although 
mentioned, these types of factors were not in focus in Gremyr and Hasenkamp’s 
(2011) analysis.  
 
However, what will be shown in our empirical study of the implementation of 
Volvo’s RD method is that most obstacles identified are to be found in these 
categories.7 8 Hence, the next section will focus on theory related to resistance and 
change. 
                                               
7 Moosa and Sajid (2010, p.754) commented that “Even the most scholarly literature available is 
focused on principles, phenomena, and techniques of Six Sigma. Consequently, social aspects of 
implementation are underestimated, undermined or undiscovered during the implementation phase.” 
8 Dahlgaard-Park (2011) observed that both organisations and many theoreticians focus on mechanistic 
and rational aspects of organisations, including believing “that measurements can cover every aspect of 
organisational improvement” instead of “the more ‘softer’ aspects such as organisational culture, 
values, people motivation, training & education, etc.” 
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3.3 Resistance to Change 
There are many examples of failed initiatives for change that have been initiated from 
the top (Beer et al. 1990). Not least, it has proved very hard to change successful 
organizations, leading to a pattern of success followed by failure and innovation 
followed by inertia (Tushman & O’Reilly III, 1997). Most change programs initiated 
from the top in organizations face resistance from employees who seem unwilling to 
accept a change. Traditionally, many change theorists start out from this perspective 
of ‘overcoming resistance to change’, e.g. Coch and French (1948). Kotter and 
Schlesinger (1979/2008) pointed at the need for managers to be aware of the four 
most common reasons for resistance: desire not to lose something of value; 
misunderstanding of the change; belief that the change does not make sense for the 
organization; and low tolerance for change. They proposed various ways to align 
those employees that potentially could resist a change initiative, e.g. through 
education and communication; participation and involvement; facilitation and 
support; negotiation and agreement; manipulation and co-optation; and explicit and 
implicit coercion. However, Dent and Goldberg (1999) claim that a major flaw in 
many change efforts is the mental model of (and belief in) an inherent resistance to 
change, which only impedes change efforts.  
 
According to Schein (1996), the resistance to change can be seen as ‘learning 
anxiety’, which comes from being afraid to try something new that might be too 
difficult or that forces one to give up old habits. On the other hand, ‘survival anxiety’ 
denotes the anxiety related to being afraid of staying the same, e.g. believing that the 
company and the job will be lost if there is no change. According to this psychology 
based theory, change will happen only if the learning anxiety is less than the survival 
anxiety of staying the same.  
 
According to Argyris et al. (1985), change implementation typically involves 
learning, a term that refers to reflection on and changing of patterns of thinking and 
acting among individuals and in groups. Argyris and Schön (1978/1996) framed two 
different forms of learning: Single-loop learning means the type of learning that takes 
place within the framework of the present assumptions; Double-loop learning is the 
result of deeper reflection on fundamental assumptions and may involve radical 
changes. What the reviewed authors have in common is that they all agree that 
learning is a core factor for any successful and sustainable change. 
 
4 The case of the RD initiative in the company 
The RD method was first introduced to Volvo in 1995 when Shin Taguchi (the son of 
Genichi Taguchi), working as a consultant for the American Supplier Institute, visited 
the company and presented Taguchi methods.9 After this visit, little action took place 
in this area until 2002, when the top executive management team initiated an 
investigation of the opportunities to decrease fault frequency and warranty costs. The 
result of this study showed that the variations in the usage environments of the 
products were not considered sufficiently during the first design efforts. This neglect 
might result in unwanted variation of the product performance close to the product 
                                               
9 Individual managers from Volvo also participated in an external one-day training program with Shin 
Taguchi called “Introduction to Robust Design using Taguchi Methods”. 
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launch, and thereby late and costly design loops for correction and higher risk of 
customer dissatisfaction.  
 
In order to improve the situation, an initiative was launched to establish a systematic 
and proactive way of working that included the RD method10. This first RD initiative 
was started early in 2004, and it was led and sponsored by the business unit’s top 
management team. The aim of the initiative was to introduce the RD method through 
creation of success stories as the first run. For this job an experienced international 
consultant was invited to the company to introduce the RD method using pilot 
projects. The first RD initiative continued for six months. Unfortunately the 
organization did not perceive good results from the application of the RD method 
through this initiative. However, the effort served as an eye-opener and provided input 
for subsequent improvements. In the section that follows we will describe and provide 
a deeper analysis of this case.  
 
4.1 The initiative 
Before the start of the initiative, top management and the consultant together 
identified three main explicit objectives for the RD initiative: improving the design 
and development processes to eliminate quality problems and resulting costs; creating 
pilot projects for robust design; and training project quality managers in robust design.  
Each pilot project was supposed to have at least five team members: three design 
engineers, their immediate supervisor, and one project quality manager. The 
expectation was that the quality managers by participating in the pilot projects would 
be able to gain sufficient expertise in the RD method to facilitate their projects after 
the consultant left. In addition it was planned to provide supplementary training to 
quality managers in order to make them competent enough to be able by themselves 
to assist projects in implementing the RD method.  
 
The main roles and activities in the initiative are illustrated in Figure 1.  
 
                                               
10 The RD method, as referred to in this paper, mainly concerns Taguchi’s methods for system, 
parameter and tolerance design.  
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Figure 1: The initiative set-up and role of the external consultant 
 
As the first step, the consultant suggested that the quality managers should collect 
information regarding at least ten different proposals for pilot projects and evaluate 
them based on a questionnaire provided by the consultant. Then they should select 
three pilot projects and prepare a necessary pilot description based on the evaluation. 
 
After the pilot projects were identified, the consultant met each pilot project team to 
introduce the RD method and review the steps to be taken. He started to introduce the 
RD method through a one-day seminar for some line managers and engineers from the 
pilot projects, covering the content and tools in the RD method and the software 
available, and providing examples. After this seminar, the three pilots started. 
 
On this first visit, the consultant directly supported the pilots for two weeks. In order 
to make the problems clear, he interviewed the pilot team members. After having 
defined the problems, the consultant explained more about the method for the 
development teams, and elaborated on how the teams could benefit from the method 
to improve their product designs. An action plan was also created for each pilot 
regarding the usage of the RD method’s tools11. During his stay, some activities 
regarding the P-diagram12 were reported and the consultant helped one pilot project to 
design a DoE experimental matrix. 
 
After two weeks the consultant left the company, having agreed to continue through 
net-meetings and e-mails. This decision was taken due to financial restriction of the 
initiative. The pilots’ progress was followed up through net-meetings and e-mails by 
the consultant, and the pilot projects seemed to be implemented almost according to 
the plan. 
 
After six months the consultant returned to the company to physically follow up the 
progress, help with the data analysis and set up the further actions to be taken.  It was 
then realized that the planned activities were not fully integrated into the projects, 
because the activities were treated as additional jobs parallel to the old way of 
working. People also complained about doing these double jobs. 
 
In all three cases, Pugh as a tool for concept selection had been utilized; however, it 
had not been treated as a decision-making tool for the projects, but as a tool to justify 
an already made decision concerning concepts. The P-diagram had also been used to 
illustrate the products’ functionality. According to the engineers, it helped them to 
understand the products’ functionality, errors and contributing parameters. It also 
increased the engineers’ knowledge about sources of variation and noise factors, 
which was quite a new step at the company. But the tools had not been integrated into 
the projects’ activities and decision-making processes. As for DoE, it had not been 
fully applied as planned in any of the pilot projects.  
 
                                               
11 These tools included the Pugh concept evaluation and selection of concepts (system design step); the 
P-diagram for functional analysis; and Design of Experiments (parameter and tolerance design steps). 
12 The P-diagram provides a description of a design concept in terms of the signal (input) and response 
(output) variables, the factors beyond the control of the designer (noise factors) and the factors that can 
be specified and set (control factors) in order to minimize the noise factors’ effect on the response 
variable, i.e. robust design. 
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The consultant continued in the company for another week to examine the results of 
the pilots and to investigate the reasons for the problems. As a consequence he 
provided a report which included the observations, gaps and further suggestions for 
how to continue with robust design in the company. This report provided input to the 
authors’ analysis together with their interview data. The outcome of this analysis was 
that several obstacles to the initiative’s success were identified.  
 
4.2 Findings – the obstacles 
As stated above, the study aims to answer the following research question: What were 
the obstacles affecting the introduction of the Robust Design Method in product 
development processes? In the following section we will present the six main 
obstacles found that were affecting the RD initiative’s success.  
I. Set-up of the initiative was unsuitable to affect proud engineers 
Top management set up the RD initiative and middle management supported the 
selection of pilot projects, while the external consultant took the role of change leader. 
He worked directly with the development teams to provide them with the required 
knowledge of the RD method, and to support the implementation in pilot cases. 
However, the development engineers did not appreciate having an external consultant 
telling them what to do in their technical areas. In one case a member of a pilot 
project said more explicitly: 
“We have very competent engineers who know the product best. We have 
already achieved very good results by relying on our engineers’ competence. I 
don’t think it was a wise idea asking an external consultant what test to 
perform and what not to.” 
 
When the consultant tried to explain the new way of working compared to the 
traditional way, many pilot participants pointed out that the company already was 
successful in the market compared to its competitors. An engineer said: 
“Why change while we have so far been very good in the market by relying on 
our technical competence and the existing way of working?” 
 
According to the statement above and similar statements, it seems that the 
development teams did not appreciate the initiative’s set-up to utilize an external 
consultant for introduction of new methods. The consultant started to set up a number 
of questions in order to be able to define the real problem. He tried to ask the 
development teams what they were doing currently, in order to open their eyes and 
create a thinking process for the reasoning of the method. But this made the “proud” 
development teams feel humiliated and they consequently rejected the initiative. The 
teams felt that the consultant was questioning their way of working, and thus they 
became negative toward the approach. Further, they believed more in their technical 
product knowledge for problem-solving than in knowledge of problem-solving 
methods.  
 
II. A narrow scope of the initiative 
The RD initiative and pilots included only the implementation of the RD method. 
However, during the interviews many of the engineers highlighted the existence of 
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problems in other processes out of the scope of the initiative, which hindered the 
implementation of the pilots. One example mentioned was problems in the 
requirement management process in the pilot projects. Not all requirements were 
clearly described in the projects and communicated to them from the beginning, prior 
to the design activities and pilot initiation. The requirements of each design solution 
area were distributed to the development teams late in the process, and the final 
requirements were given to the teams when they already had a solution ready.  
 
A lead engineer in a pilot team was quoted: 
“…and I doubt even if the needs, targets and the applications I have got from 
the product planning department are fully reflecting end-customer needs, and 
I am afraid of being blamed later on when the customer claims reach us.”  
 
Another engineer, who was negative toward RD tools and their focus, said: 
 “…do you think making a lot of effort to design a robust product with RD 
tools is more important than our challenge today concerning the 
communication of the requirements from the product planning department to 
us? We can design a robust product but we cannot guarantee that the designed 
product is what the market needs. This is where I prioritized my activities 
today in the project to ensure my deliveries.”  
 
As another example in the pilot cases, one question was repeated several times: the 
challenge of “how to balance the targets concerning quality, feature, cost and delivery 
time13”. This is mainly the question of the project priorities which affects many 
decisions concerning the priorities of deliverables through the development phases. In 
the case of the pilots, the development teams believed that the project’s scope and 
priorities had been identified by management, but these were not distributed and 
communicated to them14. It happened that engineers said: 
 “It is not clear to us which of the deliverables should be focused on while we 
are making decisions e.g. for concept evaluation or supplier selection.” 
 
Another engineer clarified: 
“In Pugh activity and concept selection, we faced some criteria concerning 
our deliverables, but in order to do the trade-offs we need to know the 
importance of our deliverables, so it is not possible to use a tool and get 
benefit from it while we don’t have the project priorities’ input to the tool 
implementation.” 
 
It seemed that the existing problems in processes outside the initiative’s scope worked 
as an obstacle to the implementation, e.g. lack of a suitable approach for ‘customer 
requirement management’, and of a settled approach for product projects’ scope 
identification and communication.  
                                               
13 The four standard categories of the projects’ deliverables in the company. 
14 It should be stressed that this is a belief that top management themselves know the project’s scope 
and priorities – which, however, is not proven. 
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III. The engineers were not convinced that the tools would solve the 
problems 
The pilot cases were initiated by introducing the RD method tools in relation to the 
described problems in each case as well as to the initiative’s main objective. However, 
the development team hardly believed that the tools introduced would be sufficient to 
reach the objective of the initiative. One engineer stated that: 
“The tools themselves were interesting, but how they should be used in the 
real application at our company processes did not become clear to me. I could 
say they were just nice ideas…  
…I could not see the benefits of the tools for our problems in the long term. I 
believe that my manager could not see it either. I didn’t face any argument on 
why we should follow the tools.” 
 
They were not convinced that the stated problems could be solved through the 
implementation of the tools presented by the consultant. The tools might help, but the 
development teams felt that there were many other important issues to be focused on 
first, to be able to solve the problems. One engineer was quoted as saying: 
“Today we have a communication problem concerning the interface with 
other development teams. We in the design team could implement the 
presented tools and they might support us a little, but they won’t solve the 
problem.” 
 
In the case of the RD initiative, the primary objective was to introduce the RD method 
in order to reduce the risk of quality problems, taking for granted that the method 
would solve the problems. However, the development teams that were being trained 
to use the RD method could not see how the RD method would contribute to solving 
the problems.  
IV. Poor integration into projects’ daily activities 
In the initiative it was recognized that in some cases the resources were not allocated 
for following the pilot cases according to the plan. The management strategies and 
priorities for resource allocations were not aligned with the initiative’s way of 
working. In some cases the resources for early simulation in DoE were not assigned or 
were assigned late. Thereby the pilot cases were faced with decreased motivation 
among the team members. An engineer said: 
“Of course we were (primarily) supposed to deliver to our management 
concerning the project (more than commitment to the pilot).” 
 
In some cases, management asked the people involved to prioritize other meetings 
instead of the RD training workshops.  It also happened that the pilot meetings were 
cancelled due to other priorities requested by management.  
 
For some participants the pilots were seen as an extra burden separated from the 
actual project activities. It was said that: 
“We are very squeezed in our time plan and we did not have time to do what 
the consultant requested.” 
Another said:  
“We were given a test plan while we had already a test plan which we were 
quite confident about.” 
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They had the opinion that RD pilots took a lot of effort away from their ordinary job. 
This means that they had perceived the method introduced by the consultant as 
something parallel to their daily activities, and not suitable to integrate into the 
ordinary daily job and framework. The pilot team members were also unaware of how 
to use the method within their actual project time plan. 
 
Concerning the consultant’s way of working as a coach and expert, the people 
involved said that they needed more support than the contracted initial two weeks. 
After those weeks the consultant continued to provide support through net-meetings 
and e-mails, but this was not enough according to the involved engineers. Instead they 
asked for more live coaching with direct involvement. One engineer who was more 
positive concerning the initiative still commented:  
“We had a plan in front of us but none of us really understood why and how to 
do it.” 
 
It seems that the arrangement with distance supervision was not sufficient and 
contributed to the fading out of the initiative due to lack of live on-the-job training 
and coaching. 
V. Lack of prerequisite statistical knowledge 
During the pilot projects it was also realized that the statistical knowledge which was 
expressed as a prerequisite for the RD method was not in place to run the pilot 
projects. 
 
One engineer commented: 
“The presented statistics seemed to be more suitable for advanced engineering 
and research projects, not a suitable approach for daily project activities in 
product development; it was more academic.” 
 
The engineers could not fully grasp the tool and its corresponding statistical analysis, 
and therefore they had difficulties accepting the method and committing themselves to 
be engaged and involved in the pilot. 
VI. Culture of fire-fighting 
During the pilot applications in the company, there was not enough motivation for 
preventive actions. As was told by an engineer, referring to the cultural problem of 
preventive work: 
 “…every individual engineer might think that good fire-fighters become 
visible, so why focus on something which could not be visible immediately?” 
 
Besides the motivation, the will of projects to spend money in early phases was not 
secured. One engineer said during the interview : 
“I am not sure if the project managers are willing to spend money in early 
phases for preventive jobs.” 
 
The reason and urgency to change from fire-fighting mode to a more proactive mode 
was not clear to the people involved in the pilots, and was not fully understood and 
supported by middle management either.  
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5 Discussion 
Naturally, there are many potential advantages in using an external consultant in 
introductions of new initiatives. However, the outcome depends to a large extent on 
how the external consultant is used and to what extent the initiative is part of what is 
perceived as central by the members of the organization. In the case of the RD 
initiative, it was not perceived very well in the company and the result of the initiative 
was limited, mainly due to the obstacles presented above. Some of the main issues 
identified will be discussed below. 
 
Improving a successful company 
The Volvo Group had been successful in the marketplace during a long period of 
time, relying on the competence of its engineers who ‘know the product best’. This 
contributed to a belief internally that technical product knowledge is the most 
important issue in problem-solving, rather than specific problem-solving methods. 
The RD initiative aimed to change the existing way of working in the same 
development teams that for years had contributed to the success of Volvo, but the 
development teams could not see any obvious reason for change.  
 
In general, it can be very difficult to change a successful company with employees 
who are proud to have contributed to their corporation’s success in the marketplace 
and who believe in their own abilities and approaches to problem-solving (Tushman 
& O’Reilly III, 1997). Therefore one should be even more careful in introducing new 
and unfamiliar tools and methods in such environments. In the RD initiative, the 
company’s previous success was not considered as a potential inhibiting factor which 
could work against the ‘tool-pushing approach’ of the initiative.  
 
Many change initiatives neglect to deal with their company’s existing beliefs or 
organizational paradigm (Argyris & Schön, 1996). The importance of creating an 
awareness of the need for change and the consequences of staying the same, i.e. 
increasing the ‘survival anxiety’, has been emphasized by various scholars (Schein, 
1996). Put into a Volvo context this means that in order to become interested in 
learning new problem-solving methods, the Volvo engineers need to become aware 
that their traditional working methods would not be sufficient for Volvo to stay 
competitive in the future. But there is also a need of providing a clear picture of what 
the change would lead to and what kind of impact it might have for each individual – 
as well as indicating a plausible road ahead, i.e. lowering ‘learning anxiety’ (Schein, 
1996). Here, Schein’s (2006) advice would be to use the strength of the company 
culture to change those elements that have become dysfunctional, i.e. to build on 
Volvo’s strengths and further reinforce its work processes by integrating robust 
design. 
 
The problem definition phase 
The RD initiative was based on the result of a diagnosis by the top management in the 
company; yet the problems that the top management had identified, and their link to 
the objectives and scope of the initiative, were not clear to other members of the 
organization. Thus the development teams could not grasp the initiative’s purpose and 
its benefits for the company and for the individuals in product development. For them, 
the initiative seemed more like an application of a set of tools pushed into the 
organization from the top, instead of a problem-solving initiative. This perception was 
also reinforced by the RD initiative’s lack of focus on the problems that the 
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development teams themselves had experienced, e.g. in the customer requirement 
management process15. Hence, the problem diagnosis at the top management and at 
the development engineer levels were not aligned, which can be seen as a weakness in 
the problem definition phase. As a result there was no sense of urgency for the 
implementation of the initiative and it remained loose in the organization.  
 
Every change initiative gets its credibility through its problem definition phase. When 
the objectives and scope of an initiative are based on a shared view of identified 
problems16, then it makes sense for the employees to be part of the change journey. A 
shared diagnosis will also overcome at least part of the resistance through a better 
understanding of the reasoning behind the initiative.  
 
The focus of the initiative; tools vs. learning focus  
The RD initiative, with an external consultant pushing tools and a predefined solution 
to proud development engineers, did not work. The primary objective of the initiative 
was to introduce the RD method in order to reduce the risk of quality problems, taking 
for granted that the method would reduce the risk of quality problems. However, the 
pilot teams did not fully believe in the assumption, as they could not see how the RD 
method would contribute to this objective. They had not utilized the RD method 
before and still they had delivered competitive products to the market and made their 
company successful. Part of their hesitation was due to the above objective for the 
initiative.  
 
With a more humble scope, letting the pilot teams test new ways of working, the 
teams might have been more positive to the initiative. There was a need for localizing 
the RD method by creating learning processes around identified problems, in order to 
develop work approaches based on local practices and potential new tools/methods.17 
In this context, robust design could be most valuable, emphasizing the importance of 
‘variation awareness’ and robustness (Arvidsson & Gremyr, 2008) – where the 
development teams, focusing on variation and on understanding its consequences, 
could build, test and learn new ways of working and consciously improve their 
practices. This kind of systematic reflection, typically done in pilot projects, provides 
the input for a gradual internal standardization of both the content and the 
implementation process (Alänge & Steiber, 2011). 
 
The middle management role  
In the RD initiative, the involvement of middle management (all levels of managers 
between the top leadership and the development teams) was not strong enough (as can 
be seen in Figure 1). As the middle managers did not lead the initiative, they did not 
act to create a context in which the development teams were stimulated to reflect upon 
their existing way of working in order to become open to learn new ways. Instead the 
external consultant took such a role, which resulted in lack of buy-in to the idea of the 
                                               
15 This is an area where one of the practices identified by Hasenkamp et al. (2009) could be helpful, 
‘Focus on the customer’. This practice concerns a systematic way of identifying key customer 
characteristics and translating them into quality characteristics that RDM aims at making insensitive to 
noise factors. 
16 Dahlgaard et al. (2011) emphasize the importance of involving people in identifying problems, root 
causes and needed actions as when change is more profound, “It requires that people understand what 
to change and why.” 
17 Hasenkamp et al. (2007) provide guidelines for when RD tools potentially could be useful. 
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initiative. Moreover, as the middle management was not fully involved, the initiatives 
did not have access to committed resources – such as technical systems, software, 
time, money and people. Lack of committed resources can easily jeopardize the 
success of an initiative. 
 
Successful change programs, in large corporations, typically start closer to the bottom 
line of the organization than in corporate staffs (Beer et al., 1990). As middle 
managers are closer to employees who are supposed to execute the change, they have 
more power to influence and get the initiative accepted among the employees, and to 
provide the resources needed, when they are needed. With a lack of middle 
management involvement18, the RD initiative remained external to the development 
teams – and this could be a factor that contributed to resistance to the initiative. In the 
case of the RD pilots, top management took the initiative to contract the external 
consultant and initiate training; and although middle managers were invited to a 
seminar given by the external consultant, and were consulted in the selection of pilot 
projects, there was still a lack of real ‘buy-in’ and involvement in the process. This 
emphasizes the difficulty of initiating change processes from above, and the need for 
a thorough anchoring of change processes initiated from above – where middle 
management is provided with the opportunity of assuming ownership of the change 
process.  
 
As in all change processes, leaders need to change their priorities and behaviour in 
line with a decision to make robust design a natural and integrated part of work for 
development engineers. It is in this context of changing behaviour and work approach 
among middle managers and development engineers that the RDM practices 
suggested by Hasenkamp et al. (2009) can become an effective means to an improved 
practical use of robust design methodology. 
 
The role of internal vs. external consultants 
There are many potential advantages in using an external consultant in introductions 
of new initiatives, not least because an experienced consultant can be specialized in a 
certain competence area and draw on experiences from several other organizations. 
However, external consultants do not have insights into the local context of an 
organization, which could negatively affect an implementation process and create 
legitimacy problems (Schein, 1996). Beer and Nohria (2000) even argue that external 
consultants can only help an organization to help itself, e.g. to coach the middle 
managers on how to define problems, be change leaders and develop organizational 
capabilities.   
 
To better support the middle management, an external consultant could also train 
internal consultants for implementation. Unfortunately, many organizations do not 
recognize the value of internal consultants and their capability to influence the bottom 
line organization, so they rely solely on experienced external consultants who cannot 
be as effective for the internal implementation (Scott & Hascall, 2002). In the RD 
initiative it was planned that Project Quality Managers should assume the role of 
internal consultants for the implementation of the RD method. However, they neither 
were sufficiently knowledgeable and trained for the initiative’s purpose, nor got 
                                               
18 Alänge (1992, p.162) pointed out “that the role of first line supervisors and middle management is 
crucial to the survival of the QC concepts”. 
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mandates from the middle management to support and coach the pilot projects or to 
assist in integrating the initiative in development project activities. Thus they acted 
very passively through the whole initiative, participating more as observers than by 
building long-term relationships with pilot teams and acting as a “pair of hands” to 
facilitate their learning process. However, properly trained internal consultants given 
appropriate conditions could assume an important role as facilitators to support groups 
changing their work processes, including using robust design. 
 
6 Conclusion 
What can be learned from Volvo’s first initiative to introduce the RD method, which 
turned out to be less than successful? From a change perspective, several ingredients 
seemed to be right. Top management had identified a clear need for robust design, and 
an experienced international consultant was contracted for introducing the RD method 
and supporting pilot projects. However, the RD method did not gain acceptance as a 
natural practice in daily product development activities, and the initiative as a whole 
became a failure.  
 
Part of the explanation for the resistance to accepting new methods from the outside 
can be found in development engineers’ rightful pride in having contributed to their 
corporation’s success in the marketplace during a long period of time. Yet other 
factors also influenced the outcome of the pilot projects. As the RD initiative came 
from top management, and an external consultant got the assignment to function as a 
change agent, the initiative in the pilot projects remained external to the development 
engineers and their immediate managers.  
 
Important learning was that in the Volvo context, an initiative with ‘tool-pushing’ and 
a predefined solution introduced by an external consultant did not work. It is also 
probable that tool-pushing would meet resistance even if the tools were imposed by 
internal units. Although top management saw the introduction of RD methods as a 
solution for identified quality problems, this view was not shared by the development 
engineers or, still more detrimentally, by middle management. This shows the need 
for a modified approach based on a stronger involvement of middle management and 
development engineers in problem analysis and in prioritizing activities/resources, if it 
is agreed that robust design is the approach selected for solving quality problems in 
the long term. In other words, there is a need to localize the initiative by creating 
learning processes in which robust design principles can become a natural part of 
work practices. 
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